|
ZOOMING OUT
Surely, answers to the questions just formulated lie in individual consumers'
logic of transcending fields, in personal views of how their consumption
is connected to wider social, economic and political processes. To illustrate
these individual kinds of logic, the notion of bounded fields (of society,
economy, politics) needs to be abandoned in favour of analytical tools
like Bourdieu's and Thornton's use of the notion of a taste culture as
a field of power relations that stretches across diverse boundaries. "In
situations of high intensity and high levels of conflict, fuzziness takes
the form of contradictions (…) in which crisp and fuzzy thinking
alike may prove ineffective and counterproductive. In such situations
social fuzzology needs to work with a different kind of logic, transcendent
logic, in order to discover unforeseen possibilities of resolution and
harmony" (Dimitrov & Hodge 2002:xiii).
In order to take the discussion onto a translocal and more inclusive level,
I would like to introduce Appadurai's (2000) model of global flows and
scapes and show the usefulness of his interpretation of the global which
lies not in the sense of locality, but in the inclusiveness of other spheres
and interaction between these. Thus, the contradictions that emerge from
the analysis of the act of consuming records can be set into their respective
widened contexts. In the space provided I will not be able to unfold the
whole of my argument and provide a comprehensive discussion, therefore
I will draw from my data to allude to what level the analysis could have
been taken. The most influential developments in late modernity lie in
what Appadurai calls the 'global flows' of motion and mediation. Highly
increased mobility of humans - migration for the reasons of work, refuge,
exile and war - coupled with increasing speed of distribution and diversity
in media, the "digital ®evolution" as I like to call it
(because it forges increasingly strong links to commerce and marketing),
merge into a theory of rupture that "explores their joint effect
on the work of the imagination as a constitutive feature of modern subjectivity"(2000:3).
Appadurai sees an important shift in the new 'work of the imagination'
that has superseded consumption as an analytical concept: if consumption
is understood as reproduction of meaning, then consumption surely must
mean an imaginative effort. He clearly distinguishes imagination as a
program for action against fantasy as a more passive and private act.
"The work of imagination, viewed in this context, is neither purely
emancipatory nor entirely disciplined but is a space of contestation in
which individuals and groups seek to annex the global into their own practices
of the modern" (2000:4).
What is otherwise labelled globalisation Appadurai here describes by the
linkages between fractal and indefinably fuzzy scapes within which individuals
create their own modernities (cf. Dimitrov & Hodge 2002:137; Bauman's
'multiple modernities', 1998, 2001a). His view of fractal imaginary scapes
that influence each other can be usefully adopted to outline the field
of vinyl consumption as a recursively reproductive framework: the mediascape
of recorded music refers to content or message of the cultural product
which can mean the musical expression as such, song texts, record covers,
or internet interaction about and based of vinyl, and the interpretation
by the ethnoscape of consumers. This is an 'imagined community'
that is characterised by increased migration and mobility, and by tensions
between the global possibility of connections and homogenising effects.
The term also refers to a group identity by default versus as "Other"
defined collective identities, a distinction on the basis of shared culture,
ethnicity, and also consumption behaviour. In the techno- and financescapes
of the music industry I identify two distinct layers of the open industrial
network and informal markets restricted by field-specific forms of cultural
capital. Technology is invariably closely tied to the scapes of the flows
of international capital. Technologies are dependent on the increased
speed of knowledge and capital made possible by the electronic revolution.
Even though Appadurai lists the following scapes on their own, I would
argue that relations between all scapes are always mediated, influenced,
and partly determined by an ideoscape. In my example, I would make the
following distinction: as illustrated in Part 3, there exists a special
micro-ideoscape or master narrative of musical authenticity within
the vinyl culture that enables to make distinctions, which is at the same
time 'food for the imagination' that constructs these scapes. In this
sense, this micro-ideoscape would find niches in every other scape, as
independent producers in techno/financescapes, or as positive ideology
in the mediascape. Outside, or rather enveloping this ideoscape, I see
the common sense-ideoscape of globalisation, the master narratives
of democracy, participation and freedom that tend to pervade all other
scapes. I will exemplify this by the contemporary debate about digital
copyright, illustrating the contested field of what I would call a 'vinyl
taste micro-ideoscape' of the vinyl "ghetto" (Black 191) against
the 'macro-ideoscape' of the master narratives of the music industry.
In this sense, techno- and financescapes cater to both ideologies in a
hegemonic struggle.
The living with records described in the past chapters revealed contradictions
between positive ideology and its manifestation in social practices of
collecting, and action that supports negative ideology. "Thus, paradoxically,
although collecting may be the quintessence of acquisitive and possessive
materialism in a consumer society, it may at one extreme be a selfless
labour of love" (cf. Part 2). Eisenberg captures this paradox:
"The true hero of consumption is a rebel against
consumption. By taking acquisition to an ascetic extreme he repudiates
it, and so transplants himself to an older and nobler world. (In the
same way the true hero of production, the chivalrous captain of industry
or reckless entrepreneur, rebels against production.) To write such
behaviour off as conspicuous consumption is to miss its point."
(Eisenberg 1987:15)
According to Belk (1995) and Material Culture perspectives, the consumer
has an element of creative control in an alienated market; "by decommoditising
and sacralising items that enter the collection, the collector also transcends
the profane commodity market" (Belk 1995:151). Following this logic,
every (record) collector would be a rebel.
Before proceeding further with this argument, we need to clarify the notion
of 'the political' for our context. Various authors have dealt with the
political in the context of music production and reception. Song lyrics
express meanings that may be shared by social groups, artists may ally
themselves to political figures to achieve common ends, groups with political
interests make use of music to further their goals (Büsser 1998,
Gilroy 1987, Thornton 1995b, Street 1986, 1997). Some of these goals may
only be remotely tied to identity and link to economic and wider social
spheres. DeCerteau argues that "the fragmentation of the social fabric
today lends a political dimension to the problem of the subject"
(1984:xiv; author's italics), which would make a rebel out of every music
consumer. We know, though, that the majority of consumers does not feel
rebellious or resistant and would refuse such a labelling. Here we come
back to the problem all theory of hegemony is fraught with: of defining
the conditions and constraints that solve the distinction between active
political practice and ideological struggle. The distinction between positive
and negative ideology is a first step, the first supports universal interests,
whereas the latter supports the specific interests of one, usually the
dominant, group (Ransome 1992:127). In the case of record consumers, the
conflict lies in the questionability of individual and alternative visions
superseding those of the music industry. In what follows I have presented
what the informants had to say about matters of 'everyday political economy'.
Subpolitics as Critique
There's unlimited supply
And there is no reason why
I tell you it was all a frame
They only did it 'cos of fame -
Who? EMI
(Sex Pistols, Never Mind The Bollocks, 1977/Virgin)
You say that every thing sounds the same
Then you go buy them / There's no excuses my friend
Let's push things forward
(The Streets, Original Pirate Material, 2002/Vice)
This widened scope accommodates my informants' views on their role as
consumers in a translocal world. In combination with Bourdieu's concepts,
distinction here takes on a second meaning: the majority of vinyl consumers
express an element of dissatisfaction with the power structures that regulate
the flows between scapes, which may translate into an outspoken critique
of the organisation of modern capitalism, the naming of an 'Immoral Economy'.
In my (arbitrary) example of a social field, vinyl consumer aesthetics
take on a decidedly political nature with tangible effects for their everyday
practices. Drawing from Bourdieu's and deCerteau's work (both 1984) and
Beck's cooperative effort with Lash and Giddens (1994), I will introduce
the concept of sub-politics and illustrate this by the hegemonic strategic
practices that are used by vinyl consumers to position themselves and
mobilise action against an "immoral" economy. The frequent contradiction
between rhetoric and action poses the problem of how to measure the success
of counter-hegemonic practices.
The preceding parts have dealt with constructed mainstream-underground
distinctions, the disengagement from subcultures, and the extension of
the definition of the social by the material. Distinction on aesthetic
grounds forms everyday strategies in relation to the music industry and
the consumption of their goods. Depending on the kind of music they like
best, some consumers, apparently vinyl consumers with a higher likelihood,
are in a position where they can simply ignore mainstream because they
often consume largely independently produced music and produce music themselves
(or download instead of buying). What often goes along with these independent
music subcultures is a withdrawal into informal economies of second-hand
markets and the production and distribution practices of independent labels.
The music industry, in this sense and from this perspective, is representative
for the mainstream economy and the manufacturing of fashions and lifestyles.
The Music Industry
What is commonly called 'the music industry' are
in fact largely four major corporations that share between them about
85% of the global music market: Vivendi Universal's Universal Music
Groups with a market share of 25,9% (IFPI
2003), is seconded by the recent fusion of Sony Music's Sony Music
and Bertelsmann AG's Bertelsmann Music Group (BMG) (Groendahl 2003)
with a combined share of 25,2%. Following up are EMI Group PLC (12%),
Time Warner's Warner Music (11,9%), and 'the rest' the IFPI as
the official body of their combined interests (50)
calls 'Independent labels' with 25% market share. In fact, these labels
are largely independent in the sense that they are not associated with
the IFPI (s.a. Prokop 2000, 2001). The music companies associated with
the IFPI sold 223,7 billion units in 2002, of which 83% were CDs (IFPI
2003). I scanned all my few hundred CDs (to a large part 1960s and 1970s
rock originally released on vinyl) and estimate that the vast majority
was (re)released on labels that are grouped under the 'Big Four', (cf.
Major Labels
2003, URL) who, as a 'lobby' of the major corporations, provides the access
to global distribution, marketing and merchandising. The IFPI's policy
that "any company, firm or person producing sound recordings or music
videos which are made available to the public in reasonable quantities
is eligible for membership of IFPI" (IFPI
2003; my italics) seems to automatically exclude small independent producers
like Brown (18) or Green (112, 113). What is referred to as a 'record
label' are, following the tendency of size being connected to eligibility
for membership in these lobbies, mostly sub-units of these corporations.
The smaller companies are in size, the more likely they are to be individual
and private businesses who confine themselves to exchanges of subcultural
capital, that is, producing the music of a network of friends and affiliates
and, in general, do not strive to 'come out big' (cf. Orange & Green,
Brown, Purple). A study of the cultural dimensions of business networks
(Jochheim 2002) revealed that there exist indeed many subcultural enterprises
that put their emphasis on autonomous development and remain indifferent
to the exclusion strategies of transnational corporations who lack interest
in economically marginal businesses. In contrast, transnational corporations
have interests and stakes in the widest and most diverse fields from newspaper
publishing via selling online music to water reclamation. It is worth
visiting the 'corporate information' section on corporations' homepages
(cf. Sony Corp.
2003, Viacom 2003,
VivendiUniversal
2003, Warner
Bros. 2003, URLs) to see how digital and pre-digital information and
communication technology, lifestyle creation, food and life's necessities
are combined under the roofs of corporations.
Sub-politics
The 'renaissance of the political' Beck observes
(1994) is neither institutional, nor is it a direct result of individualisation.
Instead, individuals develop a different view of the world by their own
dis- and re-embedding in a new reality and rationality. By introducing
more axes when defining the political sphere, Beck provides the notion
of sub-politics, meaning political action outside the sphere of formal
policy-making, carried out by individual 'experts' in their own rights,
and based on different and more radically modernised views and ideas that
overcome the dualisms of bounded fields. This additional axis also implies
a further differentiation: There is a lot more sub-politics with the rise
of individualism, but most of it seems to be affirming existing rules
instead of altering them (51). This reflects the major
labels' attitudes towards the music markets, small-scale entrepreneurs
(the more economically successful, the farther from subcultures) practice
rule-altering sub-politics only insofar as they develop and introduce
new modes of production and distribution that circumvent traditional models
(see MP3 and P2P debates below). Otherwise, they
contribute to consolidate the industry's influence on these markets. For
instance, the more popular and bigger alternative music festivals get,
the more likely they are to be sponsored by soft drink or footwear manufacturers.
The music industry is, due to its diversification into other industries
(52), seen as being less connected with the views
and wants of the consumers (cf. Behrens 2003, Holert & Terkessidis
1997, Steinert 1998). The terms 'mainstream' and 'underground' are still
in use, but maybe their meaning can in this context be seen as a distinction
between rule-affirming and rule-altering politics, or, to illustrate their
discursive dimension, negative and positive ideology.
I have found that (potentially) rule-altering politics
take the form of two deeply intertwined practices: the subpolitics of
consumer practice and subpolitics of consumer ideological discourse. A
common strategy on the part of the music lover who cannot afford the music
he/she wants access to is what deCerteau (1984:29 ff.) calls the tactics
(53) of 'coups' that can be landed on 'enemy territory',
an act of "poaching (…) on the property of others" (1984:xii)
in the form of copying music from friends and downloading from the internet.
The widely discussed and mediated piracy debate outlines these practices.
The Piracy Debate:
Looking at the statistics for the German and later
the global market, worldwide, turnover has indeed dropped by 11,3% (31,2%
since 1997) to 2 billion € (54), of which 0,14
billion went to independent businesses (IFPI
2003, URL). Of the 223.7 billion units sold in 2002 (-7.6% from 2001),
83% were CDs. While the sales of CDs slumped over the last two years,
the sales of the few records that were manufactured (around 1%) remained
stable and even growing (IFPI
Germany 2003, Media Perspektiven 2003, tagesschau.de
2003, URL). Germany, constituting 6% of the global market (US 39%, Japan
16%, UK 9%, France 6%), is symptomatic for the rest of the Western world,
as well as newly industrialising countries who experience a similar phenomenon.
The main projected reason by the IFPI for plunging sales is piracy (55),
owing to a rise in access to CD-Rom burning devices (half the population
and a third of all households in Germany) and internet download capability
through broadband internet connections. More than 600 million songs were
downloaded from the internet in 2002, 90% of those who own a burner copy
music with it, and half a billion blank CD-Roms were sold in Germany in
2002, leading to the conclusion that private copies cause the majority
of profit loss (IFPI Germany 2003).
Effectively, these losses seem to be a combined result of major's sales
policy and the availability of digital technology: technological drivers
to increased mediation of music are digitisation and compression technologies
like MP3, streaming media via broadband connections; these are utilised
on the basis of social drivers like the possibility of access to free
music, decentralised peer-to-peer technology largely developed by the
"key consumer groups, those under 18, [who] are highly computer-literate
and, typically, are not old enough to obtain a credit card" (Fox
2002; cf. Kasaras 2001, Speedfacts
2001). The prototypes of these open-source programs were in fact written
by bored teenagers or students of computer sciences who influenced "the
increasing role of the internet in the distribution of music [that] is
transforming the music industry from an oligopolistic, highly concentrated
industry characterised by significant barriers to entry, to one which
- as we have seen with Napster - every user is also a potential distributor"
(Fox 2002:2; cf. Miller & Slater 2000).
IFPI's subcontracted study on downloading behaviour
claims that 94% of users download from free sources - which are of course
illegal now that jurisdiction on digital copyrights is implemented. The
reason to download illegally is justified by 82% by the high cost of CDs
(IFPI Germany 2003; cf. Haug & Weber 2002). In a sociological study
on downloading, Haug & Weber (2002) present peer-to-peer (P2P) (56)
networks (like KaZaA, Gnutella, Emule, etc.) as a consumer's initiative
that was to fill the void and exploit the potential. These networks are
often characterised by values of communality and sharing, a moral code
of reciprocity that does not apply to legal download sites (57).
In fact, many regular users display a "Robin Hood mentality"
(Haug & Weber 2002), anti-capitalist attitudes and sentiments that
mean that legal factors have an insignificant influence on consumer behaviour.
The global players in the music industry have been
reluctant over the last two years to invest in this market, but now, almost
panicked by the popularity of P2P networks, this formerly unexploited
niche in the online music market is now being filled by commercial interests.
In order to secure these interests, the IFPI reacts largely by litigation
of individual peer-to-peer network users. The RIAA has recently made the
news by trying to shut down P2P-networks and suing users for copyright
violations (58). In the move against users of illegal
filesharing capabilities, the industry is forgetting that these people
are also music fans and potential customers (Helmore 2003). Metallica's
litigation of users that downloaded their songs from the internet shows
that legal persecution is not a business strategy but "a public relations
disaster" (Fox 2002:8). Forcing P2P providers
to shut down only to buy the rights to the software and turn them into
subscription services, as was the case with Napster and MP3.com, creates
disbelief in the projected values of the major corporations (Haug &
Weber 2002) and reveals connections between various industries (59).
The products that are effectively sold less are compilations advertised
in TV and radio, and contemporary (mainstream) releases, and, correspondingly,
the collection of hits and favourites is the main motivation to use P2P
platforms (IFPI Germany
2003; Haug & Weber 2002, Speedfacts
2001). Considering my discussions with the informants, and trying to adopt
their position, this becomes understandable: why pay for all the filler
on a mainstream album or buy a whole CD for just one song you like (cf.
Yellow 335)? One of the reasons given by the industry to decide to buy
instead of 'stealing from the artist' is that the state loses several
100 million € a year in tax, which is countered by the persistent
refusal to lower unjustified higher taxation on CDs as opposed to books
(Boycott-RIAA
2003, URL). In fact, people are still willing to buy, but only under fair
conditions. For Blue, (174; cf. Orange & Green 105) digital songs
do not replace the record or CD, indeed, most consumers I talked to still
buy CDs (as I do) and see the download as a qualitatively worse promotion
service that is generally an incentive to buy the record. The projected
piracy threat is further weakened by the fact that sales in low-price
segments actually rose (IFPI
2003). It remains to be seen how commercial one song-downloads from legal
internet sources fare. For now, Bulkley's article (2003) assesses the
music industry's dwindling options, which is now turning to making their
backcatalogues available online in their commercial subscription services.
Attempts are made to cover the losses in profit, allegedly due to piracy,
with other market strategies like downloadable ring tones for mobile phones:
charts tracks are now available to install on private cellphones, some
of which sell better than the actual single on CD, while in Asia ring
tone piracy is as yet unlegislated and blooming (Kreye 2003). The alleged
losses themselves are dubious since digital technologies like MP3 players,
mobile phones, and integrative hardware (digital television and radio)
in general are booming (cf. Green 108, Katz & Aakhus 2002). A "deepening
relationship between marketing community and the music industry"
(Garrity 2003) is noticeable in the campaigns planned with soft drink
manufacturers and fast food chains to make legal downloads attractive.
Rising turnover in the "premium segments", that is, promotion
runs for enterprises like McDonald's or AOL (IFPI
2003), underscores this development. Generally, more variety and lowered
prices for the consumer through internet music is prognosed (Dolfsma 2000),
helped by the impact of technological and social forces and the democratisation
of access (Fox 2002).
I asked all informants whether they downloaded
music from the internet (cf. Appendix
1) and about their attitudes on the piracy debate and about possible
solutions. Many record collectors are generally sympathetic to forms of
communication that exclude the industry (Black 189), an attitude that
tends to be linked to subcultures with positive ideologies. Purple (270),
Brown (37), and White (245), on the other hand, situate themselves more
on the producer side: for them, it is "not ok" to illegally
download music if small artists that produce "cool stuff" are
robbed of their basis. Reiterating to some degree the corporate rhetoric
which presents itself in its 'company goals' as a 'moral economy', White
(246) compares consumer goods like t-shirts and skateboards with vinyl
records, emphasising that all manufactured goods have a corresponding
exchange value. Admitting that this exchange value does not reflect the
actual production costs (60), he supports Red's view
to some degree who thinks piracy is "great" because it hurts
big corporations (210; cf. Green 111, Blue 149).
To justify consumer behaviour that runs counter to the ideas of the industry,
positive ideology serves as a discursive tactic, structuring dispositions
that create certain attitudes: The arguing for a moral economy is best
illustrated by the discrepancy between record user's values (Blue 164,
Orange & Green 110, 111) and those attributed to the industry that
create a view of the industry as philistines, enemies of the soul, who
bring the rules of capitalism into the realm of art (Eisenberg 1987:23).
The music industry, in spite of their rhetoric (or in fact because of
it), is seem by most vinyl users as immoral. 'Mainstream' here subsumes
everything immoral and in disregard of legitimate aesthetics from the
record consumer's perspective: consumers are aware of alleged low instincts
and predatorism that are inherent in free market capitalism. Black (189;
cf. Red 208) sees nothing but a "money-making machine" in the
innovatory drive of the music industry. In this sense, music television
and mainstream artists selling vinyl are not a contribution to 'authentic'
music culture but a strategy to keep the pressing plants and advertising
industry busy (Red 227, 232). Brown, from the vantage of the independent
label (cf. Green) refers to the music business as a "power game"
which is more often than not played unfairly (18), big money rules the
game and ensures mass-market presence and visibility where small independent
producers fail (21, 22), underscoring the exclusiveness of the industry
noted above (cf Martin 1995:254 ff., Wicke 1995). White (255) observes
an extreme commercialisation of subcultures by the pervading presence
of big corporations and their obscure transnational and trans-market activities:
(256)
White: Yeah, of course, but I mean this problem, this phenomenon is
not just in the music business, that's just / globalisation, in spite
of the nonsense of the term and considering how often it's misused,
but / linkages of economic businesses which you don't understand/can't
grasp anymore, you know / I don't know anymore what's Nestlé
and what isn't / Nestlé is uncool too, but / I probably buy stuff
too that's sold by Nestlé.
As a result of profit interests over consumer interests, Blue (178) describes
how every music underground is "made big" and "watered
down" in the process, reflecting Purple's description of the 'vampirism'
of commercial interests below (275).
The reasons for this qualitative "watering down" of popular
music in general is attributed to attitudes of executives towards consumers:
Pink connects the infrastructural changes in the music industry since
the 1980s with the dominance of classical economic thought, the free market
ideology. "Marketing men" have no interest in the art itself,
which used to be the case with 1960s producers. Pink distances himself
from contemporary pop music by nostalgic and romanticising notions of
the 1960s, when producers and industry seemed to aim at a common goal.
(73)
Pink: I guess the eighties thing is that digital / sound, and CDs were
really geared up for that digital production. / The values of eighties
records / compared to seventies and sixties stuff, I mean you don't
/ in the eighties you just don't seem to get artists disappear into
the studio for months and months and months // and carry out something
really astounding / you probably do, I'm probably just ignorant, but
// it's all really like / lay down a vocal track, overdub it a few times,
stick some drums in it, guitar in it, just jing, jing, quickest thing,
like loop / stuff, just play one chorus and loop it, loop it, loop it,
edit it down to like the bare bones and it's fucking, there you go,
you know? / Put some sound effects on, maybe some echo, digital effects
everywhere 'cos it's [pointedly] cheap and easy.
(74)
Pink: But it took him [Brian Wilson] months and months and months to
do. / And by the eighties record companies weren't prepared to do that,
were they, you know, they could do it a lot cheaper if they just got
Kylie Minogue / go in and sing a verse or two // get Stock, Aitken &
Waterman to do the rest. // It's all marketing men, isn't it, so / I
guess, like / vinyl is like an era where musicians / maybe they didn't
run the game, but // the pendulum was in their ////
I: favour
Pink: their favour, yeah, definitely. // You agree (?) // And people
like George Martin, I mean Beatles record producer / he was like always
there for the artist / whereas Stock, Aitken & Waterman, the sort
of eighties producers, were always there for payola (61)
/ really, aren't they? They're not there for the, you know, nurturing
talent or anything like that.
(75)
Pink: And of course there's pop shite. / with vinyl, everyone who's
been to a second hand record store and ploughed through / racks and
racks of // crap, you know? / Pop Goes the Seventies, you know, and
Knees Up Mother Brown rubbish. Tin Pan Alley / kack. /// I mean, there's
// but / I suppose it's a nostalgia thing, you know, like current trends
in music don't do very much for me anyway.
Yellow thinks the changes lie in record companies' alienation from the
artistic process: likening them to "insurance companies", they
are accused of having the wrong attitude. In contrast to the 1970s, he
observes a media over-saturation "round the clock" that, as
Black notes (197), creates formulaic, and therefore inauthentic, lifestyles
to consume.
(332)
I: In what respect has this changed then, what do you think?
Yellow: I think it's less about the bands now / really /// you know,
it's about products and shifting units. / It always was to a certain
extent / but // it wasn't so noticeable. / You know, no one noticed
when Jefferson Airplane finally signed with a big label. / No one sort
of accused them of selling out, it was obviously the thing to do when
you wanted to sell more records. // But now it's corporate. / That's
the big difference.
Yellow: And you didn't even bother listening to the record before you
bought it, it came out, it was by Led Zeppelin, so you went out and
bought it. // Luckily none of their records were crap but they could've
easily released a duff one and you still would've bought it [laughs].
/ But that's changed now. / There's more of it out there anyway.
I: More of what?
Yellow: More formats. / You know, you can download it on a computer,
your Mp3, / you've got MTV, you've got it around the clock. // It wasn't
'round the clock then in the same way.
(333)
Yellow: Most of the time the artists themselves have been ripped off
// realistically, haven't they? // And // it's the record company that's
the one making all of the obscene profit. // So it's like / you tend
to think of it like insurance companies / you know, you can't actually
/ stop ///
(335)
Yellow: Yeah, the recording industry has had, you know, a stranglehold
on // pretty much all of it. / You either dance to their tune / or you
don't dance to any tune at all, do you?. / (…) I mean if you think
back when // the while thing exploded with the Beatles in the early
sixties, that was a scam beyond all belief. / You know, a pop band had
two or three hit singles, so that's what went on the album / which were
already out on 45 anyway. // And then the rest of it would be essentially
filler. / And dodgy cover versions, and all the big names were doing
it. // (…) It wasn't until artists started to taking albums seriously
as opposed to 45s. / That they started releasing an album where the
whole thing was meant to be good. // (…) And then you ended up
with the Michael Jackson thing where they released every track as a
single, you know, once MTV arrived, and being Michael Jackson they'd
obviously be all crap. / But that's beside the point. /// I mean / who
knows what's round the corner? //
Green points to the contradiction between the music industry's benevolent
ideology of protecting artists' rights and promoting young talent, and,
on the other side, contributing to their own financial losses by providing
the means of reproduction. As a result of corporatisation, subcompanies,
out for their own profit, produce the means by which another subcompany
suffers losses.
(108)
Green: Yeah, and you can burn CDs yourself. // and of course producing
CDs has become much cheaper than / producing records for example, pressing
vinyl really isn't cheap // and CDs, I guess that's right, that that's
a general trend, that everything / on the other hand the single channel
can do a lot // but then he can only do it if he buys the equipment
// that's another interesting thing, on the one hand the music industry
has an interest in people not being able to download and burn stuff,
but on the other / like Sony or any other big record company, then they
also produce the burners and the CD players and MiniDisc players and
of course they also want that people buy these.
Orange: And it works for them /
Green: yeah / and the equipment and all / they always make money in
either case, they profit from selling many CDs and they profit from
selling burners // basically they don't give a fuck
I: Yeah, but they pretend they do
Green: Yeah, they pretend
I: probably because their profit margins are being cut
Green: Yeah, there are so many different corporations, but especially
Sony // I think they / of course they say they're outraged and what
not, but / in the end I don't think that's the case
Orange: They can't afford to confess that it's legitimate because they
keep earning from other products
Green: So it's unspoken, but that's like it is.
But there remains the possibility of dancing to
one's own tune, as many informants illustrate. Green highlights the tactic
of 'disintermediation' (Fox 2002), the cutting out of middlemen in distribution
channels that arises out of indifference or open antagonism against the
music industry (110, 112). The cutting of overhead costs in independent
alternative music subcultures characterises informal DIY production, distribution
and merchandising. Music-producing informants are well informed about
independent production and distribution channels, a form of knowledge
that is passed on within their respective subcultures (Brown 18, 46; Red
202, Green 112, 113). In this sense, I would agree with Schalt (1999;
cf. Stephen 1998, Wicke 1995) that "punk culture has maintained a
particularly organic connection to the 1960s; one that in many respects
remains vibrantly engaged with certain kinds of social transformations
we associate with an era epitomized by the kinds of music that were produced
at the time". Artists that experienced these times or took up these
ideas encourage DIY production and, in general, irrespective whether they
partake in Major's business, are sympathetic and supportive of these forms
of production (62).
In contrast, after having profited from his pioneering successes in German
Hiphop on the same independent producer basis (273), Purple has been running
a shop for Hiphop paraphernalia for several years now. Because of the
reported "flood' of German Hiphop he is at the time not releasing
any new material, but produces other artists. I see him occupying a more
or less secured mainstream niche from which he is exploiting the subcultural
capital he accumulated through independent releases. He is certainly aware
of market mechanisms, but does no longer think about alternatives outside
his secured position. From this vantage, it is understandable that downloading
is out of question for him. Clearly, he is a willing contestant in "the
race", but his performance in it is strongly tied to subcultural
capital. He says idealism is bound to get co-opted, raising apparent contradiction
between selling and selling out:
(274)
I: (…) What you sell here is mainly Hiphop scene clothing to
/ mainly teenagers
Purple: Hey, commercialism, definitely, (one love), commerce. / You
have to do it somehow, you have to sell yourself your whole life long,
and if you can't sell yourself or your product / then you drop out of
the race, that's clear. // Authenticity / is always a catchword, when
are you authentic, (…) when do you appear somehow / unconvincing
/ and the credibility's missing / that's the question / a kind of tightrope
walk, we just said before we start writing shitty lyrics or poncy lyrics
/ or cruising / to appear to be cool / I'd rather do nothing and write
when I need to say something / or when it {itches my liver} like. /
And then there was so much that you could not distinguish anymore who's
who / and then there was a flood, and that's why the whole thing / went
down the drain. /// like it was the case with Techno for a while / there
were lots of people who / how to put it / have laid the foundations
/ and then more and more and more and more came out, and then the people
couldn't decide anymore what's good and what's crap // and then it starts
to get problematic.
(275)
I: What was or is the cause of that?
Purple: That is after all connected to these major labels / that they
/ signed everyone that hadn't climbed the trees on three, and said:
it revolves around Hiphop, Hiphop is definitely / mainstream. // Now
we've got to jump that train / and suck money out of that / and we do
it as long as there's money to be sucked out / and when it's on the
downturn we jump off / then it dies / but the underground (…)
I: Like vampires the way you describe it. /
Purple: Vampires? / Well, yeah, of course. / But I mean that's / that's
the market.
I: Do you think there's nothing you can do against that?
M: I don't think you can do anything against that, no. / What would
you want to do against that?
I: Good question [laugh].
Purple: I know guys that used to be idealists. / Then they got onto
major labels and after two years they talked exactly the same as the
types they sat in front of, I mean / that's what you're made to become,
see, I'm also a (xxx) now, I also see that I sell my sweaters as expensive
as possible, and somehow get it / know exactly where I've got to draw
the line when someone says something about the price, I say then we
don't do business, you know / that's how you've got to be, it's clear
/ one is the head of it all, one is making profit / and they want to
keep on making profit. / I don't know, it's always this kind of philosophising.
/ What can you do against it?
The piracy debate shows that vinyl consumers know and have fairly well-developed
ideas of how the business would be more 'moral' and offer constructive
critique of production and sales policies (Brown 36-41, Blue 150, Yellow
333ff.; cf. Lovell 2003). Blue exposes the industry's arguments against
piracy as "bullshit" because the industry keeps profiting from
other market segments while small bands actually suffer the consequences
(147-149). Red opens a distinction against music where the artists want
to make money; when punks are not true to themselves, for example by signing
a contract, the music is not as much fun to him anymore. The musicians
need to decide whether they want to be products, in the same manner, consumers
have to think about the consequences of their consumption (210, 214).
Another dimension of self-organisation lies in the role of digital media
for networks of interpersonal relations and the importance of these between
independent producers (Brown, Orange & Green, Purple; cf. Boycott-RIAA,
RIAA Radar,
RIAA Files;
URLs). Appendix 4 (10) provides graphic examples for counter-communication
in practice.
Several informants link these views to explicitly political attitudes
and the awareness of 'everyday politics'. Orange, for instance, would
rather 'have a lie-in' than participate in parliamentary politics by voting:
(125)
Orange: I won't go to vote.
I: Why not?
Orange: Because I think it's a waste of time // Because I wouldn't have
the slightest clue who to give my vote to because I trust none of them.
I: Because they're politicians?
Orange: I don't trust in politics, no / So when I have a lie-in on voting
day and miss it that way then / I've done something in all fields //
I: By having a lie-in?
Orange: By having a lie-in, by not going there // yeah, simply to have
the choice / why should I //
I: But it's a democratic basic right, innit?
Orange: It's a democratic basic right in a non-democratic state, so
what good is it?
Green: That's just the thing, last time I spilled my brains before the
elections / what to do, there are also always recommendations on what
to do // in magazines / last time it read you should vote PDS // but
on the other hand, you know / I'm against voting because / you can't
really change anything by it, then again / if you don't vote you should
do something in another way and not say I don't vote and I don't do
anything else either, that / is not legitimate // one also shouldn't
feel to highly about oneself because they voted, because it's really
/ nothing.
(126)
Orange: I'm in favour of doing your thing outside of politics / and
be political yourself / means actively shaping politics even though
you don't write it on your banner.
I: How do you do that in your daily life then?
Orange: With the band, with the lyrics, in the shows, in the points
of contact with / people
I: Seen generally or musically?
Orange: Seen musically, but you can transfer that in all other areas.
/ When you have a discourse drunk in a bar and the other can / take
something home / out of that / which moves him on personally / then
that's politics as well, that's / you could [amusedly] call it a little
campaign / for what you stand in for without pressing it on people //
that's politics too, and basically that's real politics for me
/ where I see that something can be done // and for that I don't need
to go and vote ///
The informants' ideals with regard to life in general are summed up by
White (cf. Blue 164):
(247)
I: What ideals are these, can you mention a few?
White: Well, whatever / a life in society / relatively, that would be
the ideal case, with few constraints, with tolerance, with / permissiveness,
freedom, free expression of speech and no censorship, / a consciousness
for the environment, observing human rights. //
On the grounds that these ideals are not given, Red explicitly calls
himself anarchist and quotes the slogan "elections don't change anything,
otherwise they'd be forbidden" (238). In contrast to this radicalisation
emerging from the realisation that politics is to a large degree controlled
by commercial interests, it may also lead to a general loss of interest
in politics, sometimes even pronounced disinterest as a consequence of
disillusionment (Blue 164, 165, Silver 296; cf. Meyer 2001). Discussing
links between arms and music industry, Blue remarks:
(166)
H: Well, they're all wankers // I think // dunno, maybe I see it too
pessimistically, but I simply think that as // that as a good, upright
person you can't make a career / I don't think (…) //// I think
you always have to make compromises / that // are shady (…) //
and there you are back to the basic evil of mankind, the greed for more
/ for power // and somehow you can't erase that // and for that reason
it doesn't work / therefore there's no just political system.
From my general impression, I assume that all informants would subscribe
to Bill Hicks' (explicit American comedian) view. In an interview on a
Public Service television show he said what he was censored to say on
the Letterman Show: "The point I'm making is about the idea of freedom
of expression / and I believe that // there's an agenda in mainstream
media, and it's fairly easy to back this up // to keep people stupid,
docile and apathetic". Open criticism of the global organisation
of labour and capital is becoming more pervasive, especially in the form
of satire and comedy and in the fields of entertainment and leisure. Compare
M.Moore's international success of Stupid White Men (published
by HarperCollins, an asset of R.Murdoch's media empire). Within academia,
this criticism tends to be illegitimised as truly academic work; Chomsky's
efforts (1991, 1999), as well as Bourdieu's later involvement with Attac
(cf. Pinto 2000), disqualify rather than strengthen their role as contributors
to important contemporary fields of critique. Internet communication about
these issues as reflected in Adbusters
and CorporateWatch
(URL) can further consumer consciousness and help to reveal the consumer's
"role as a cog".
(107)
Green: CD is a lot more abstract // and I think that is generally a
phenomenon in society, everything is made to be more abstract so people
get the feeling / it's all so remote to me, so you can better fit in
your consumer role. // That's another thing I think about CDs, that
it's more of a consumer thing than vinyl / of course you can consume
records too, but / like I said, with records you're still closer to
the music //
Orange: Like the way a record is recorded / it practically floats on
it, that's a phenomenon / and it's also a brilliant thing
Green: And I also think with a record you're more / likely to say, hey,
music, ok, I can play music myself // and with a CD it's still / another
further step in the production cycle.
(127)
Orange: And I think that goes out well beyond personal freedom because
I think / that through this wrong image that's conveyed about drugs,
politics hasn't just failed in this but made propaganda against / for
alcohol, against hash / very simplified, and what stands actually in
no relation because alcohol is for me / the crassest drug.
(…)
Green: when it's gone so far that you're an alcoholic then it's too
late, then no one wants anything to do with you.
Orange: Exactly. / Then you don't function anymore, then you're not
interesting anymore in the sense of / that you fill the role of the
cog that's thought out for you as a consumer / you are to bring in the
cash, simply put // and it is quite offensively advertised, that you
have better chances with women and everything's better.
The metaphor of the cog implies both a fixed role for the consumer as
well as the power to bring the whole machine to a standstill. Which of
these two contrary positions the consumer adopts (or is made to adopt)
depends as much on the scientific tools used to describe this position,
as it depends on the consumer's ability to situate him/herself consciously
in a web of power relations.
|
|